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IMMIGRANT RIGHTS IN JEOPARDY: A 
DENIAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION IN DE LA PAZ v. COY 
Abstract: On May 14, 2015, in De La Paz v. Coy, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that immigrants cannot bring Bivens actions seeking 
damages against individual federal immigration officials for Fourth Amend-
ment violations. The court reasoned that because the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952 (“INA”) already provides immigrants with an adequate rem-
edy for Fourth Amendment violations, a Bivens remedy should not be extend-
ed to this immigration enforcement context. The court based its conclusion on 
its determination that the INA both offers immigrants sufficient remedial 
mechanisms for constitutional violations and effectively deters federal immi-
gration officers from acting unconstitutionally. This Comment argues that the 
Fifth Circuit erred in holding that the INA provides an adequate remedial 
scheme for immigrants who fall victim to unconstitutional stops, arrests, and 
seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The INA provides no mean-
ingful remedy to such immigrants and has no ability to deter federal immigra-
tion officers from engaging in unconstitutional conduct. 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 14, 2015, in De La Paz v. Coy, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit held that the implied cause of action established in 1971 by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents (“Bivens”) 
did not extend to immigrants seeking damages against federal immigration 
officials for Fourth Amendment violations.1 The Fifth Circuit relied largely 
on the U.S. Supreme Court’s two-prong framework for analyzing the exten-
sion of Bivens remedies to new contexts.2 Under the first prong of this 
framework, a court should not allow a Bivens action if an existing statutory 
scheme already provides adequate redress to the victims of unconstitutional 
                                                                                                                           
 1 De La Paz v. Coy (De La Paz II), 786 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (holding that an 
individual can bring a private action for damages directly against a federal official who violates 
his or her constitutional rights); Ann-Marie Woods, Note, A “More Searching Judicial Inquiry”: 
The Justiciability of Intra-Military Sexual Assault Claims, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1329, 1366 n.136 
(2014) (describing the background of the Bivens action). This holding applied to all immigrants 
subject to deportation, whether or not they at one point had legal status, or originally came to the 
United States without documentation. De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 378. 
 2 De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 375. 
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conduct.3 Further, under the second prong, even if an alternative remedial 
scheme does not exist, Bivens actions should be denied if special factors 
exist which caution against extending Bivens to a new context.4 In De La 
Paz, the Fifth Circuit held that the civil removal proceedings set out in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”) provide an alternative 
process for protecting the Fourth Amendment rights of immigrants subject-
ed to unconstitutional traffic stops and arrests and that special factors re-
quired denying a Bivens remedy for claims arising out of federal immigra-
tion enforcement actions.5 
This Comment focuses on the first prong of the Bivens analysis, the al-
ternative statutory scheme bar to a Bivens remedy, and argues that the Fifth 
Circuit erroneously applied the first prong of the Bivens analysis when it 
concluded that the INA provides an adequate remedial scheme for immi-
grants who fall victim to unconstitutional stops, arrests, and seizures at the 
hands of federal immigration officials.6 This Comment further argues that 
the INA provides no meaningful remedy to such immigrants and has no 
ability to deter federal immigration officers from engaging in unconstitu-
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id.; see also Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (holding that the judiciary should 
refrain from creating a new damages remedy when an existing process adequately protects the 
constitutional interest at stake); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67–68, 70 (2001) 
(same); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980) (same); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 
245, 247 (1979) (same). 
 4 De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 375; see also Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67–69 (noting that special 
factors, such as separation of powers concerns, foreclose imposition of a judicially created Bivens 
remedy even when a plaintiff does not have the opportunity for adequate compensation); Carlson, 
446 U.S. at 18 (same); Davis, 442 U.S. at 245 (same); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (holding that impo-
sition of a judicially created damages remedy was appropriate where there were no special factors 
advising hesitation in an area of law in which Congress had chosen not to authorize a damages 
remedy). 
 5 See De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 375 (concluding that there was an adequate existing process 
for protecting the Fourth Amendment rights of immigrants stopped and arrested unconstitutionally 
and that special factors required denying the availability of a Bivens claim to such immigrants). 
The INA established the federal statutory scheme for regulating immigration to the United States. 
Pub. L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see Arizona 
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (providing overview of certain provisions of the 
INA). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”) is primarily a set of laws that govern 
the admission and exclusion of foreign citizens into the United States. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1381 
(2012) (governing immigration generally); id. §§ 1401–1504 (governing nationality and naturali-
zation); id. §§ 1521–1525 (governing refugee assistance); id. §§ 1531–1537 (governing alien ter-
rorist removal); see Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 (summarizing entry and removal procedures). 
 6 See infra notes 83–105 and accompanying text (explaining that the INA does not provide an 
alternative, meaningful remedy for violations of immigrants’ Fourth Amendment rights); I.N.S. v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1984) (“The mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing 
on a subsequent deportation proceeding.”); In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 79 (B.I.A. 1979) 
(noting that an unconstitutional stop and arrest does not tamper with the government’s ability to 
successfully deport the illegally apprehended immigrant). 
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tional conduct.7 Part I of this Comment discusses the factual background of 
De La Paz, as well as the history and framework of the Bivens action.8 Part 
II details the Fifth Circuit’s holding and reasoning in De La Paz.9 Part III 
argues that De La Paz was decided incorrectly because the INA fails to ade-
quately protect immigrants’ Fourth Amendment rights.10 
I. THE BIVENS ACTION: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION  
THROUGH DAMAGES 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1971, the Court has crafted a 
framework for analyzing extensions of the judicially crafted damages reme-
dy to new contexts.11 Prior to De La Paz, however, the immigration en-
forcement context had not been explicitly addressed by the Court or any 
federal circuit court.12 Section A of this Part describes the two immigration 
stops and the alleged Fourth Amendment violations that led to the litigation 
in De La Paz.13 Section B details the history of the Bivens action and the 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See infra notes 83–105 and accompanying text (explaining that the INA does not provide an 
alternative, meaningful remedy for violations of immigrants’ Fourth Amendment rights and does 
not deter federal immigration officers from engaging in unconstitutional conduct); see, e.g., 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040 (holding that the government’s illegal arrest of an immigrant 
does not affect the government’s ability to deport that immigrant); Lopez-Gabriel v. Holder, 653 
F.3d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 457–58 (1976)) (stating 
that the prospect of evidence being suppressed during immigration deportation proceedings does 
not have a deterrent effect on law enforcement officials); Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Operations 
and the Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless Home Raids, 89 
N.C. L. REV. 507, 507 (2011) (explaining that, despite internal regulations, U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) has made warrantless home raids in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment a “key component” of immigration enforcement activities). 
 8 See infra notes 11–47 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 48–82 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 83–105 and accompanying text. 
 11 See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550 (explaining how the Court analyzes the proposed extension of 
the Bivens remedy to new contexts); Ryan D. Newman, From Bivens to Malesko and Beyond: 
Implied Constitutional Remedies and the Separation of Powers, 85 TEX. L. REV. 471, 482 (2006) 
(detailing the history of the Bivens action and how the Court developed its analytical framework); 
infra notes 38–47 and accompanying text (detailing the two steps that the U.S. Supreme Court 
follows when deciding whether to extend Bivens to a new context). 
 12 See De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 375 (explaining that no court had decided whether Bivens 
extends to claims of constitutional violations that occurred during federal immigration arrests and 
detentions); Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that a Bivens 
remedy cannot be extended to immigrants challenging their unlawful detention, but limiting the 
holding to the unlawful detention context); Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 620, 625 
(5th Cir. 2006) (holding that an immigrant stopped at the border had constitutional rights at the 
time of the incident, but declining to decide whether a Bivens remedy was available to defend 
those rights). 
 13 See infra notes 15–34 and accompanying text. 
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framework the Court has established for analyzing its applicability in new 
scenarios.14 
A. The Border Patrol Stops and Arrests of Daniel Frias and  
Alejandro Garcia de la Paz 
The De La Paz case began on April 28, 2010, when Daniel Frias was 
stopped by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) agent Arturo Torrez 
while driving in Texas over 250 miles from the Mexican border.15 Before 
Torrez made the stop, he passed by Frias’ truck and noticed that the vehicle 
had a large shielded rear bed and what appeared to be bodies lying in the 
bed.16 After noticing this and learning that the truck was not from the area, 
Torrez believed he had enough information to stop Frias’ vehicle.17 Follow-
ing the stop, Torrez questioned Frias briefly, and Frias admitted that he was 
a non-U.S. citizen without legal documentation allowing him to be in the 
United States.18 Torrez then arrested Frias.19 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See infra notes 35–47 and accompanying text. 
 15 Frias v. Torrez, No. 3:12-CV-1296-B, 2013 WL 460076, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2013), 
rev’d in part sub nom. De La Paz II, 786 F.3d 367. Frias was driving a Dodge 3500 pickup truck, 
a work vehicle common to the area. Id. According to facts alleged in the complaint, Torrez be-
lieved that Frias was abiding by all traffic laws when Torrez stopped Frias’s vehicle. Complaint at 
9, Frias, No. 3:12-CV-1296-B. A U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) agent works for the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). See Border Patrol Agent, U.S. CUSTOMS & 
BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/careers/join-cbp/which-cbp-career/border-patrol-agent 
[https://perma.cc/7EY6-AS6A] (describing the role of a CBP agent). CBP agents do not enforce 
local or state laws; rather, they enforce federal laws related to border security. See Authority of 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/authority-us-customs-and-border-protection-agents-
overview [https://perma.cc/W24N-QJCX] (noting that CBP agents only enforce federal statutes 
and regulations). 
 16 De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 370. According to the opinion issued by the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Texas and the facts alleged in Frias’ complaint, there were not bodies 
lying in the backseat and the truck was not modified in any way. Frias, 2013 WL 460076, at *1; 
Complaint, supra note 15, at 5, 7. 
 17 Frias, 2013 WL 460076, at *1; see infra note 36 and accompanying text (describing that 
law enforcement requires reasonable suspicion before making a stop). Once Torrez noticed the 
large shielded rear bed, he turned around and followed Frias’ truck. De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 370. 
Torrez then pulled alongside Frias and again saw what looked like bodies lying in the backseat. Id. 
He then radioed for a “1028” to determine where the truck originated and learned that it was not 
from the area. Id. 
 18 De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 370. Frias was living in the United States at the time and had a 
valid New Mexico driver’s license. Frias, 2013 WL 460076, at *1. 
 19 De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 370. He was taken into custody as a noncitizen present in the 
United States in violation of federal immigration law. Id. His immigration proceedings were later 
terminated. Id. 
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Frias brought five claims against the U.S. government and Torrez in 
response to this stop and arrest.20 One of these was a Bivens claim against 
Torrez individually.21 Frias alleged that Torrez violated his Fourth Amend-
ment rights because Torrez lacked both reasonable suspicion for the stop 
and probable cause for the arrest.22 Torrez moved to dismiss the Bivens 
complaint, arguing that the INA provides a remedy for Frias’ claim, and 
thus makes a Bivens action unavailable.23 The U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas disagreed with Torrez and held that the INA did 
not bar Frias’ Bivens claim.24 
Several months later, on October 11, 2010, Alejandro Garcia de la Paz 
(“Garcia”) was traveling in Texas 100 miles from the Mexican border when 
he passed CBP agents Jason Coy and Mario Vega.25 Upon passing Garcia, 
Coy and Vega decided to turn around and stop him.26 During the stop, Vega 
questioned Garcia about his citizenship status, but Garcia refused to answer 
the question.27 Garcia was then arrested by the agents.28 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Id. Immigrants that have made an entry into the United States and are present on U.S. soil 
are afforded Fourth Amendment, due process, and other constitutional rights. See Lopez-Mendoza, 
468 U.S. at 1040 (holding that immigrants are afforded full Fourth Amendment rights, but limiting 
the application of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary remedy during civil deportation proceed-
ings); Brian G. Slocum, The War on Terrorism and the Extraterritorial Application of the Consti-
tution in Immigration Law, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2007) (explaining that although 
immigrants seeking entry into the United States are not afforded full constitutional protection, 
immigrants present on U.S. soil have rights under the Constitution). Additionally, immigrants are 
allowed to bring claims against United States federal agencies. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 
1034 (allowing an immigrant’s claim against the former Immigration and Naturalization Service, a 
federal agency, to proceed). 
 21 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034; Frias, 2013 WL 460076, at *2. Bivens claims are al-
lowed to be brought against individual federal agents. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (holding that an 
individual can bring a private action for damages directly against an individual federal official 
who violates his or her constitutional rights). 
 22 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; Frias, 2013 WL 460076, at *1–2; see also infra note 36 (explain-
ing the provisions of the Fourth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of “reasonable 
suspicion,” and the Court’s definition of the probable cause standard). 
 23 De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 370. 
 24 Id. 
 25 De La Paz v. Coy (De La Paz I), 954 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537–38 (W.D. Tex. 2013), rev’d in 
part, De La Paz II, 786 F.3d 367. Alejandro Garcia de la Paz (“Garcia”) was traveling in Texas 
100 miles from the Mexican border when he passed was traveling in a red Ford F-150 extended-
cab pickup truck, a very common work truck in the area. Id. 
 26 Id. The agents decided to stop Garcia after following him for an unspecified period of time. 
Id. According to his complaint, Garcia was driving in accordance with all applicable state rules 
and regulations. Id. 
 27 Id. Garcia was an undocumented immigrant without legal status in the United States. Id. 
Garcia’s immigration proceedings were eventually administratively closed. De La Paz II, 786 F.3d 
at 371. 
 28 De La Paz I, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 537–40. 
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In response to his arrest, Garcia sued Coy, Vega, and the U.S. govern-
ment.29 Like Frias, Garcia brought a Bivens claim against Coy and Vega 
individually, alleging that his stop and arrest were both unconstitutional.30 
Coy and Vega moved to dismiss the Bivens claims, asserting, like Torrez, 
that the existence of alternative remedies under the INA barred a Bivens 
claim in this context.31 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Texas rejected this argument, held that the INA did not provide an adequate 
alternative remedy, and refused to dismiss the claim.32 
The federal immigration officers involved in both Bivens claims, Tor-
rez, Coy, and Vega, appealed the respective district court decisions refusing 
to dismiss the Bivens claims.33 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit consolidated the 
Bivens actions of Frias and de la Paz into one case.34 
B. The History and Application of the Bivens Action 
On June 21, 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court first recognized a private action for 
damages against federal officers who violate an individual citizen’s consti-
tutional rights.35 The defendants in Bivens were individual federal law en-
forcement agents who had conducted an unlawful search of the plaintiff’s 
home and had arrested him without probable cause in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.36 By recognizing the plaintiff’s cause of action under 
                                                                                                                           
 29 De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 371. In addition to the Bivens claim, two of his claims against the 
U.S. government sought declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Id. His other two claims against the United States government were brought 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for false imprisonment and assault. Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 370–71. 
 34 Id. at 367. 
 35 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; see also Malesko, 534 U.S. at 66 (providing the Bivens action’s 
historical background). 
 36 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Court has declined to precisely define or quantify the probable cause 
standard, but the general definition is “a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Maryland v. Prin-
gle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). In 
determining whether an officer has probable cause to make an arrest, a court will consider the 
totality of the events leading to the arrest and examine these facts from the viewpoint “of an objec-
tively reasonable police officer.” Id. (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). 
The U.S. Supreme Court also has determined that, under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer 
can briefly stop and detain a person for further investigation if there is reasonable suspicion, sup-
110 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:E. Supp. 
the Fourth Amendment, the Court created a damages remedy derived direct-
ly from the Constitution.37 
A Bivens action has two purposes: (1) to provide effective remedies to 
individuals who are the victims of unconstitutional conduct by federal agents, 
and (2) to deter federal officers from engaging in future unconstitutional con-
duct by imposing individual liability.38 In order to further these goals, the 
Court has developed a two-step inquiry to determine whether to recognize a 
Bivens remedy in new contexts.39 First, a court must decide whether any ex-
isting legal remedy adequately safeguards the constitutional interest in ques-
tion and makes the creation of a judicially created remedy unnecessary.40 
Second, even absent an alternative remedy, courts must be cognizant of their 
limited judicial role and pay heed to any special factors that would caution 
against authorizing a new class of federal litigation.41 
The Court has followed these analytical steps and advanced the Bivens 
remedy’s constitutional goals by extending the Bivens damages remedy un-
der two additional Constitutional provisions: the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment.42 When considering the extension of Bivens to a new 
                                                                                                                           
ported by sufficient facts, that criminal activity “may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 
(1968). The Fourth Amendment, however, requires officers to articulate more than just a general 
“hunch.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). Alt-
hough the standard for when a police officer can make a stop is lower than that for probable cause, 
the officer must have at least some level of objective justification for making the stop. Id. 
 37 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (reasoning that this legal remedy must be implied because no 
statute or other legal provision provided the plaintiff with meaningful compensation for the viola-
tion of his constitutional rights); see also Malesko, 534 U.S. at 66–67 (noting that the Bivens deci-
sion was the first time the Court exercised its “authority to imply a new constitutional tort” in the 
absence of statutory authorization). 
 38 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70 (explaining the Bivens action’s purpose). See generally Alex-
ander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Indi-
vidual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 814 n.17 (2010) (explaining that although the origi-
nal Bivens decision focused on providing adequate compensation to victims of unconstitutional 
conduct, the Court has interpreted the decision to promote deterrence through individual liability). 
 39 See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550 (detailing the two factors involved in the two step sequence); 
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18–19 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397) (same). 
 40 Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. 
 41 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983) (holding that courts must be mindful of any 
special factors that would make authorization of a new federal damages remedy inappropriate). 
Even in the absence of an alternative remedy, federal courts must always be mindful of separation 
of powers concerns, and consider all relevant factors before approving a novel extension of Bivens 
in an area of law in which Congress has declined to provide a statutory remedy. See Wilkie, 551 
U.S. at 550 (detailing the Court’s Bivens remedy analytical framework). Analysis of these special 
factors usually involves considering why Congress decided to not already authorize a damages 
remedy, but can include all relevant factors. See id. (explaining the special factors analysis); 
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (same). 
 42 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67–68 (explaining the Court’s history of extending the Bivens 
action); Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18–21, 23 (allowing a Bivens claim against individual prison offi-
cials when the plaintiff’s only alternative remedy, a Federal Tort Claims Act claim against the 
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context, however, the Court examines the legal and factual scenario pre-
sented by the case, rather than extending Bivens on an amendment-by-
amendment basis.43  
Indeed, in subsequent decisions, the Court has narrowed the availabil-
ity of Bivens actions and has declined to extend the remedy to most new 
factual scenarios.44 The Court has made clear that under the first step of the 
analysis, when a court examines existing, alternative remedies for protect-
ing the constitutional interest, such remedy need not provide specific mone-
tary damages to foreclose the application of a Bivens action.45 In addition, 
the Court has taken the second prong’s special factors limitation seriously, 
giving a high degree of deference to Congress’s choice to decline to provide 
a remedy for certain constitutional violations.46 Accordingly, although the 
purpose of a Bivens action is to accomplish the lofty goals of deterring fed-
eral officers from violating private citizens’ constitutional rights and to pro-
vide individual victims of constitutional violations meaningful legal reme-
dies, there are significant limitations on the action.47  
                                                                                                                           
United States, would not deter the unconstitutional acts of the individual prison officials); Davis, 
442 U.S. at 245, 248–49 (applying Bivens principally because the plaintiff, a former congressional 
staff member who was discriminated against on the basis of her sex, had no other remedy availa-
ble after suffering this violation of her due process rights). 
 43 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 572 (2d Cir. 2009). A Bivens remedy is not available for 
every Fourth or Fifth Amendment violation, even if a prior case allowed a Bivens action under that 
same Amendment. Id. Compare Davis, 442 U.S. at 245, 248–49 (allowing a congressional em-
ployee’s Bivens discrimination claim under the Fifth Amendment), with Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 
414 (rejecting a Bivens remedy for a Social Security recipient’s Fifth Amendment claim). 
 44 See, e.g., Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550 (establishing that a Bivens action is not “an automatic 
entitlement no matter what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest”); Malesko, 
534 U.S. at 68 (detailing the history of the Court’s refusal to extend Bivens to all situations in 
which the victim of the unconstitutional conduct could not collect damages under the alternative 
remedial scheme); Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423–27, 429 (reasoning that a Bivens damages remedy 
is not always the best way to implement a constitutional guarantee). 
 45 See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550 (explaining the Court’s history of denying Bivens claims). For 
example, in 1983, in Bush v. Lucas, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to allow a Bivens remedy 
against federal officials in the context of a federal employment First Amendment violation even 
though the plaintiff did not have an opportunity to collect damages or hold the federal officials 
individually accountable. 462 U.S. at 386–88. The Court instead held that the administrative re-
view process in place, which allowed the erroneously demoted plaintiff to recover back pay and 
receive other employment benefits, provided adequate redress, thereby making a judicially crafted 
Bivens remedy unnecessary. Id.; see also Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68 (detailing the history of the 
Court’s refusal to extend Bivens to all situations in which the victim of the unconstitutional con-
duct could not collect damages under the alternative remedial scheme). 
 46 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68–69 (detailing the Court’s history of denying Bivens actions 
based on the special factors analysis); Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423 (explaining that when Congress 
has designed a statutory scheme to explicitly provide administrative remedies for constitutional 
violations that may occur under the statute, the Court has not created new Bivens remedies). 
 47 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68–69, 70 (explaining that the Bivens remedy has only been ex-
tended twice: “to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers 
alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked 
112 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:E. Supp. 
II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S BIVENS DECISION IN CONTEXT 
As a matter of first impression, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit held in 2015 in De La Paz v. Coy that Frias and de la Paz could not 
bring Bivens actions against the individual CBP agents who stopped and 
arrested them because their claims could be addressed during civil removal 
proceedings provided under the INA.48 The court concluded that the INA 
provided an adequate alternative process for protecting the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of immigrants subjected to illegal traffic stops and arrests.49 In 
reaching this decision, however, the court did not precisely explain how the 
INA’s Fourth Amendment protections operate during removal proceed-
ings.50 Section A of this Part reviews the Fifth Circuit’s decision to decline 
to extend the Bivens remedy to this legal and factual scenario.51 Section B 
explains the Fourth Amendment protections provided to immigrants during 
removal proceedings under the INA.52 
A. The INA Does Enough: The Fifth Circuit Declines to Extend Bivens 
The Fifth Circuit declined to extend Bivens to the immigration en-
forcement context because of the INA’s extensive coverage in the field of 
federal immigration law.53 Specifically, the court held that because the INA 
had specific provisions meant to protect immigrants’ Fourth Amendment 
rights and mechanisms by which immigrants could enforce these rights, it 
                                                                                                                           
any alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer’s unconstitutional conduct”); see 
also Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18–21, 23 (allowing a Bivens claim under the Eighth Amendment); 
Davis, 442 U.S. at 245, 247–49 (extending Bivens under the Fifth Amendment). 
 48 De La Paz v. Coy (De La Paz II), 786 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 49 Id. at 375. The Fifth Circuit also found that special factors necessitated the denial of Bivens 
remedies for claims arising from stops and arrests conducted for the purpose of immigration en-
forcement. See id. at 375, 378 (concluding that there was an adequate existing process for protect-
ing the Fourth Amendment rights of immigrants stopped and arrested unconstitutionally and also 
that special factors required denying the availability of a Bivens claim to such immigrants). The 
Fifth Circuit specifically held that the existing procedures under the INA were enough to consti-
tute a denial of Bivens to immigrants stopped in violation of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of 
any special factors. Id. at 377–78 (holding that the INA’s comprehensive set of regulations pro-
vided an adequate remedy and, on its own, made extending Bivens to the immigration enforcement 
context unnecessary). 
 50 Id.; see also I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1984) (holding that the gov-
ernment’s illegal arrest of an immigrant does not affect the government’s ability to deport that 
immigrant under the INA’s current statutory framework); In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 79 
(B.I.A. 1979) (describing the irrelevance of an unconstitutional stop and arrest during a deporta-
tion proceeding). 
 51 See infra notes 53–68 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 69–82 and accompanying text. 
 53 See De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 375–77 (citing Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 
2499 (2012)) (detailing the INA’s comprehensive regulation of immigration law in the United 
States and, specifically, the legal protections provided to immigrants). 
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provided an adequate alternative remedial scheme.54 The court emphasized 
that the INA’s extensively detailed removal procedure for immigrants un-
lawfully in the United States was the type of elaborate statutory scheme that 
should not be augmented by a judicially created Bivens remedy.55 
First, the Fifth Circuit focused on the fact that the INA included specif-
ic provisions that were able to sufficiently protect the rights of undocument-
ed immigrants stopped by CBP agents.56 The court cited the INA provision 
that stated that CBP agents could only search individuals if they had reason-
able cause to believe that such a search would disclose evidence that would 
warrant denying the individual admission to the United States.57 The court 
also noted that CBP agents could only make an arrest if they had a reasona-
ble belief that the person to be arrested had committed or was committing a 
felony or immigration violation.58 The court also cited the INA sections 
mandating that an apprehended immigrant be taken, without unnecessary 
delay, before the nearest available immigration officer with the power to 
examine an immigrant’s right to remain in the United States.59 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See id. at 375–77 (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)–(c) (2012) (providing the powers of fed-
eral immigration officers), 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c) (2015) (providing standards that must be followed 
by federal immigration officers while enforcing federal immigration law), and 8 C.F.R. 
§ 287.10(a) (2015) (providing the details of the DHS internal review process)). 
 57 De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 376. The relevant INA section provides: 
Any officer or employee of the Service . . . shall have power to conduct a search, 
without warrant, of the person, and of the personal effects in the possession of any 
person seeking admission to the United States, concerning whom such officer or 
employee may have reasonable cause to suspect that grounds exist for denial of ad-
mission to the United States . . . which would be disclosed by such search. 
8 U.S.C. § 1357(c). 
 58 De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 376. The cited statute gives an immigration official the power, with-
out warrant, to arrest any “alien who in his presence or view is entering or attempting to enter the 
United States in violation of any law or regulation made in pursuance of law regulating the admis-
sion, exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). An official can also arrest 
any alien “if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of 
any such law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” Id.; 
see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(i) (“An arrest shall be made only when the designated immigration 
officer has reason to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense against the Unit-
ed States or is an alien illegally in the United States.”); 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii) (“A warrant of 
arrest shall be obtained except when the designated immigration officer has reason to believe that the 
person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.”). 
 59 De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 376; see 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (requiring that aliens arrested for 
immigration violations “be taken without unnecessary delay for examination before an officer of 
the Service having authority to examine aliens as to their right to enter or remain in the United 
States”); id. § 1357(a)(4) (requiring that aliens arrested for felonies related to immigration regula-
tions “be taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest available officer empowered to 
commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States”). 
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Second, after noting these provisions, which regulated the conduct of 
CBP agents when interacting with immigrants, the court documented the 
ways in which immigrants could enforce their rights under these regula-
tions.60 The two main avenues available to immigrants were motions, dur-
ing removal proceedings, to suppress illegally seized evidence, and internal 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) review processes that the INA 
mandated for violations of the above statutory provisions.61 The court stated 
that motions to suppress were satisfactory remedies because an immigrant 
who successfully suppresses evidence may be able to terminate removal 
proceedings.62 Furthermore, the court cited DHS review procedures that 
mandated investigations for complaints of alleged Fourth Amendment vio-
lations, required appropriate action in the case of actual violations, and al-
lowed for criminal prosecutions of agents for using excessive force against 
immigrants.63The court held that such procedures, in combination with an 
immigrant’s right to file motions to suppress, adequately protected immi-
grants’ Fourth Amendment rights and thus foreclosed extension of a Bivens 
action.64 
In concluding that extending Bivens to the immigration enforcement 
context was unnecessary, the court held that the INA did not need to provide 
monetary damages in order to qualify as an adequate alternative remedy 
scheme.65 The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Cor-
rectional Services. Corp. v. Malesko to affirm that the INA need not provide 
such damages, or any avenue for action against individual agents, in order 
to be an adequate alternative remedy scheme.66 Additionally, like the Su-
                                                                                                                           
 60 De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 376–77. 
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. 
 63 Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 287.10(a) (providing that allegations that federal agents violated the 
standards of conduct for immigration enforcement activities “shall be investigated expeditiously 
consistent with the policies and procedures of the [DHS] and pursuant to any guidelines issued by 
the Secretary”); id. § 287.10(b) (“Any persons wishing to lodge a complaint pertaining to viola-
tions of enforcement standards contained in § 287.8 may contact the [DHS], Office of the Inspec-
tor General . . . . With respect to employees of the former INS, persons may contact the Office of 
Internal Audit, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.”); id. § 287.10(c) (stating that 
at the conclusion of an investigation, “the investigative report shall be referred promptly for ap-
propriate action”); Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51 (determining that evidence seized under 
certain egregious circumstances may be suppressed during removal proceedings); United States v. 
Brugman, 364 F.3d 613, 614 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming the criminal conviction of a border patrol 
agent for violating an alien’s right against excessive force). 
 64 De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 376–78. 
 65 Id. at 377. 
 66 See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 
367, 386–88 (1983)) (holding that an administrative review process, which allowed an unconstitu-
tionally demoted federal employee to recover back pay and retroactive seniority, provided ade-
quate redress, thereby making a judicially-imposed Bivens remedy unnecessary). 
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preme Court’s Malesko decision and its 1988 decision in Schweiker v. 
Chilicky, the Fifth Circuit found that a Bivens remedy should not be allowed 
in this case because Congress, through the INA, had already provided what 
it considered an adequate compensatory system for constitutional violations 
in the sphere of immigration law.67 The Fifth Circuit held that the choice to 
implement a damages remedy against individual federal immigration agents 
should be left to the legislature.68 
B. Fourth Amendment Protection Under the INA 
Although the INA does provide remedial mechanisms during removal 
proceedings for unlawfully stopped and arrested immigrants, more context 
is needed in order to fully understand the way in which these mechanisms 
operate.69 This section will explain two key concepts that will help frame 
the Fifth Circuit’s holding: (1) the relevance of illegal arrests during remov-
al proceedings, and (2) the way in which the Fourth Amendment, and the 
accompanying exclusionary rule, apply during removal proceedings.70 
First, the legality of an immigration arrest is usually irrelevant during 
removal proceedings because regardless of the arrest’s legality, deportation 
will still occur as long as evidence obtained independent from the arrest is 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 377 (noting that an analysis of the legislative history of Unit-
ed States federal immigration law makes it clear that Congress purposely declined to provide an 
individual damages remedy); see also Malesko, 534 U.S. at 69–74 (denying a Bivens claim be-
cause existing statutory provisions provided the claimant with an effective remedy); Schweiker v. 
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (rejecting a Bivens remedy for Social Security disability 
claimants who were denied benefits in violation of due process of law because Congress had al-
ready enacted a statutory scheme which it felt provided sufficient redress for victims of constitu-
tional violations). The Fifth Circuit also cited to Congress’s repeated legislative action regarding 
immigration to reinforce the point that it has consciously and purposefully crafted the existing 
INA scheme. De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 377 (citing REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 
119 Stat. 302; Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009-54; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214; Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978; Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, 100 Stat. 3359; Immigration and Nationality 
Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703; Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911). 
 68 De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 377–78; see Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 561–62 (2007) 
(favoring legislative action over extending a Bivens remedy in a context too large and complicated 
for unilateral judicial action). 
 69 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040 (explaining the Fourth Amendment’s lack of suffi-
cient protection during removal proceedings under the INA). 
 70 Id. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that declares that evidence obtained 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, under certain factual contexts and legal proceedings, will 
be deemed inadmissible. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (describing the 
purpose and effect of the exclusionary rule). It is principally “designed to safeguard Fourth 
Amendment rights . . . through its deterrence effect.” Id. 
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sufficient to support deportation.71 In a majority of removal proceedings, 
the only matter the government needs to prove is the alien’s identity and 
lack of lawful presence in the United States.72 The most important evidence 
acquired through an illegal arrest is custody of the immigrant’s body, evi-
dence that can be used to prove identity.73 Because the immigrant’s body 
and identity cannot be suppressed, even if the government concedes that the 
alien was apprehended through illegal arrest, search, or interrogation, the 
government must only prove alienage during the removal hearing.74 The 
government can then prove alienage through a variety of evidence obtained 
independently of the illegal arrest or even through evidence closely con-
nected to the illegal arrest itself.75 Once the government proves identity and 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See, e.g., Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040 (holding that, under the INA, an illegal arrest 
of an immigrant has no effect on the government’s ability to deport that alien during a deportation 
proceeding); Hoonsilapa v. I.N.S., 575 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1978) (explaining that it is “well 
settled” that an unconstitutional arrest of an immigrant does not require suppression of evidence 
that is gathered through an independent source); Wong Chung Che v. I.N.S., 565 F.2d 166, 168 
(1st Cir. 1977) (holding that an illegal arrest does not invalidate subsequent removal proceedings); 
In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 79 (noting that the government can successfully deport an im-
migrant regardless of the fact that the immigrant was initially stopped and arrested in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment). Removal proceedings begin when the government files a Notice to Ap-
pear with an immigration court. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13–.14 (2015) (providing the procedure for 
commencing immigration proceedings); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1(a) (2015) (providing that fed-
eral immigration proceedings are commenced with the filing of a Notice to Appear). When this 
Notice is served on an immigrant, it informs the immigrant that he or she is charged with being 
present in the United States in violation of U.S. immigration laws, and demands that he or she 
appear in U.S. immigration court to respond to the charge. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012) (provid-
ing the procedure for a federal immigration deportation proceeding); 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1(a) (provid-
ing that federal immigration proceedings are commenced with the filing of a Notice to Appear). In 
De La Paz, the constitutional interest at stake was Frias’s and Garcia’s right to be free from illegal 
search, seizure, and arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 370–
371. Neither Frias nor Garcia challenged the initiation of immigration removal proceedings 
against them under the INA. Id. Nor did they maintain that any procedure during the removal 
proceedings, including their detention, violated their constitutional rights. Id. Rather, they both 
challenged the unconstitutional conduct of CBP agents, which occurred before removal proceed-
ings against them even began. Id. 
 72 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043 (stating that in most deportation proceedings “the 
sole matters necessary for the Government to establish are the respondent’s identity and alienage” 
(citing In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 79)). 
 73 See id. (noting that the identity of an alien can be ascertained through the alien’s body, 
evidence that cannot be suppressed even if the body was captured through illegal arrest); In re 
Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 79 (explaining the evidentiary consequences of an illegal immigra-
tion enforcement arrest). 
 74 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043 (noting that immigration officers must only prove 
alienage once the immigrant’s identity has been established through an arrest); Wong Chung Che, 
565 F.2d at 168 (holding that an illegal arrest does not invalidate subsequent removal proceed-
ings); In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 79 (holding that the identity of an alien is not suppressi-
ble, even if discovered through unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation). 
 75 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043. The government can prove alienage through any records 
lawfully in its possession, including immigration records. See In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 
79. It can also use other means, such as the immigrant’s own testimony during removal proceed-
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unlawful presence through admissible evidence, it can then concede the un-
constitutionality of the initial stop and arrest, and a successful motion to 
suppress will have no effect on the proceedings.76 
Further, even where the legality of the underlying arrest is relevant to 
proceedings, immigrants are not afforded the Fourth Amendment’s normal 
protections when attempting to suppress that evidence.77 Unlike in criminal 
proceedings, any voluntary statement that an immigrant makes to support a 
motion to suppress unconstitutionally gathered evidence can be used against 
him to carry the government’s burden of proving alienage, the very thing 
the immigrant is trying to contest.78 Thus, an immigrant is often forced to 
implicate his own deportability while challenging a constitutional violation, 
thereby making the challenged violation irrelevant.79 
In addition to this deficiency, the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary 
rule does not apply during removal proceedings.80 For an immigrant to suc-
cessfully have evidence deemed inadmissible during his removal proceed-
ing, he has to prove that the manner in which the evidence was seized was 
“so egregious” that, not only was there a Fourth Amendment violation, but 
there also was a violation of his right to fundamental fairness and due pro-
                                                                                                                           
ings. See Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 640 F.2d 1139, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 1981) (concluding that 
illegal arrest and interrogation do not preclude the government from relying on voluntary admis-
sions made at the removal hearing); In re Carrillo, 17 I. & N. Dec. 30, 32–33 (B.I.A. 1979) (hold-
ing that the immigrant’s voluntary statement made at the removal hearing rendered his inadmissi-
ble testimony obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment irrelevant and unnecessary). 
 76 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043 (noting that even if an unconstitutional arrest initiat-
ed deportation proceedings, deportation will still occur as long as there is evidence independent 
from the arrest to support a deportation order); In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 79 (same). 
 77 See Katris v. I.N.S., 562 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1977) (describing the lack of Fourth Amend-
ment protections provided to immigrants during removal proceedings). The Fourth Amendment 
provides that, during a criminal trial, a defendant’s testimony in support of a motion to suppress evi-
dence cannot be admitted against the defendant at trial to establish ultimate guilt. Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 (1968). Immigrants in removal proceedings are not afforded this protection. 
See Katris, 562 F.2d at 867–69 (explaining that if an immigrant who is unlawfully present in the 
United States admits his or her unlawful status during testimony in support of a motion to suppress 
evidence, this testimony can be used against the immigrant to support a subsequent deportation or-
der). 
 78 See In re Carrillo, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 32–33 (holding that an immigrant’s voluntary state-
ment made at the removal hearing rendered his illegally obtained, inadmissible testimony irrele-
vant and unnecessary). To support a motion to suppress, the immigrant must personally testify to 
the events that surrounded the constitutional violation. See In re Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609, 
611 (B.I.A. 1988) (explaining that when an immigrant challenges the admissibility of the govern-
ment’s evidence during a deportation hearing, the immigrant must personally testify to the facts 
supporting the challenge). 
 79 See In re Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 611 (holding that an immigrant can be deported 
based on evidence of alienage gathered through the immigrant’s testimony). 
 80 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51 (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s exclu-
sionary rule does not apply during removal proceedings); In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 188 
(B.I.A. 1984) (noting that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in deportation proceedings); 
see also supra note 70 (explaining the exclusionary rule). 
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cess of law under the Fifth Amendment.81 Thus, even if an immigrant is 
able to successfully argue that he was stopped and arrested in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, any evidence of alienage acquired by the federal 
officer will not necessarily be rendered inadmissible.82 
III. DE LA PAZ: A MISGUIDED DECISION WITH GRAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
IMMIGRANTS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s 2015 decision in De 
La Paz v. Coy was erroneous because the INA does not provide an alterna-
tive, meaningful remedy for the violation of immigrants’ Fourth Amend-
ment rights.83 The purpose of a Bivens remedy is to provide victims of un-
constitutional conduct adequate redress and to deter federal officers from 
participating in future unconstitutional conduct.84 In order to be adequate, 
the alternative remedy must have the capacity to effectively safeguard the 
relevant constitutional interest.85 
The provisions of the INA cited by the Fifth Circuit fail to safeguard 
immigrants’ Fourth Amendment rights for two reasons.86 First, in contrast to 
                                                                                                                           
 81 In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (B.I.A. 1980). In 1980, in In re Toro, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals stated that every Fourth Amendment violation will not necessarily result in 
exclusion of the seized evidence. Id. In order for this evidence to be suppressed, the circumstances 
surrounding the arrest and seizure need to be “so egregious” that they constitute a violation of the 
Fifth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and fundamental fairness. Id. 
 82 See Santos v. Holder, 506 F. App’x 263, 264 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the evidence 
federal immigrant agents seized during an immigrant’s arrest should not be suppressed, even 
though the immigrant was arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment, because the federal 
immigration agents’ conduct was “not egregious”); Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 778–79 
(8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply in deportation proceeding because 
the alleged arrest without probable cause was not an egregious violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment). 
 83 See De La Paz v. Coy (De La Paz II), 786 F.3d 367, 375–78 (5th Cir. 2015). See generally 
David Antón Armendáriz, On the Border Patrol and Its Use of Illegal Roving Patrol Stops, 14 
SCHOLAR 553, 553–54 (2012) (outlining the circumstances that allow the CBP, regardless of the 
INA’s constitutional protections, to abuse its power and conduct illegal stops and arrests along the 
border region). 
 84 See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) (explaining the Bivens action’s 
purpose); Reinert, supra note 38, at 814 n.17 (explaining that although the original Bivens deci-
sion focused on providing adequate compensation to victims of unconstitutional conduct, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has interpreted the decision to promote deterrence through individual liability). 
 85 See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 623 (2012) (declining to extend Bivens when an 
existing statute already “protect[ed] the constitutional interest at stake”). A plaintiff’s ability to 
bring state tort law claims against the federal agents who violated his or her constitutional rights is 
one example of an existing statute that adequately protects the constitutional interest at stake. Id. 
 86 See I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply with full force during removal proceedings); Treadwell, supra note 7, 
at 507 (explaining that federal immigration officers routinely violate immigrants’ Fourth Amend-
ment rights despite internal regulations forbidding these violations); infra notes 90–105 and ac-
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the Fifth Circuit’s holding, motions to suppress illegally acquired evidence 
are usually irrelevant to removal proceedings, and even when relevant, are 
very rarely successful.87 Second, there is ample evidence that internal DHS 
review procedures very rarely penalize immigration officers’ constitutional 
violations and do nothing to inhibit their unconstitutional conduct.88 Thus, 
the INA neither provides immigrant victims of unconstitutional conduct 
adequate redress nor deters federal immigration officials from acting uncon-
stitutionally.89 
Due to the irrelevancy of the initial arrest’s constitutionality during 
removal proceedings, a motion to suppress any illegally acquired evidence 
does not provide an immigrant with a satisfactory remedy in the case of a 
Fourth Amendment violation.90 In most cases, the government will be able 
to deport an immigrant even after conceding that immigration officials 
stopped him in violation of the Constitution.91 An allegation, or even proof, 
                                                                                                                           
companying text (detailing the reasons why the INA fails to adequately protect immigrants’ 
Fourth Amendment rights). 
 87 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51 (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s exclu-
sionary rule does not require suppression of illegally seized evidence during removal proceed-
ings); In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 79 (B.I.A. 1979) (describing the immateriality of the 
government’s initial unconstitutional arrest of an immigrant during that immigrant’s deportation 
proceeding); infra notes 90–97 (explaining why motions to suppress illegally acquired evidence 
do not provide an adequate remedy for an immigrant subjected to an unconstitutional stop and 
arrest). 
 88 See Treadwell, supra note 7, at 507 (explaining that ICE agents systematically disregard 
internal regulations prohibiting them from committing Fourth Amendment violations); infra notes 
98–105 and accompanying text (detailing why internal DHS review procedures fail to adequately 
protect immigrants’ Fourth Amendment rights). 
 89 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040 (holding that the INA’s current provisions do not 
limit the ability of the government to deport an unconstitutionally arrested immigrant); Henry G. 
Watkins, The Fourth Amendment and the INS: An Update on Locating the Undocumented and a 
Discussion on Judicial Avoidance of Race-Based Investigative Targeting in Constitutional Analy-
sis, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 565–69 (1991) (noting that immigrants in removal proceedings 
are very rarely successful in challenging immigration officials’ conduct that violated the regula-
tions governing immigration enforcement); infra notes 90–105 and accompanying text (detailing 
the reasons why the INA fails to adequately protect immigrants’ Fourth Amendment rights). 
 90 See, e.g., Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040 (holding that, even if an immigrant is able to 
prove that he was unconstitutionally stopped and arrested, it will have no effect on the govern-
ment’s ability to successfully pursue deportation); Hoonsilapa v. I.N.S., 575 F.2d 735, 738 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (explaining that an immigrant’s unconstitutional arrest will not allow the immigrant to 
suppress evidence obtained independently from the arrest); Wong Chung Che v. I.N.S., 565 F.2d 
166, 168 (1st Cir. 1977) (explaining that the law is clear: an immigrant’s illegal arrest that leads to 
the immigrant being identified for deportation proceedings does not affect the proceedings); In re 
Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 79 (noting that, regardless of an initial unconstitutional stop and 
arrest, the government can successfully deport an immigrant based on any evidence legally in its 
possession). 
 91 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040 (holding that an illegal arrest does not affect removal 
proceedings); In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 79 (noting that, even if an immigrant is able to 
prove that he or she was unconstitutionally arrested, he or she will not necessarily be able to pre-
vent deportation). 
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of an illegal arrest, stop, or seizure is only relevant in the small percentage 
of removal cases where the government must rely on evidence directly ob-
tained from an illegal arrest to prove alienage.92 Unless the immigrant’s 
case falls into this small percentage, he is left with absolutely no recourse 
for a Fourth Amendment violation.93 
Further, even in the rare situations where illegally obtained evidence is 
relevant, the INA still does not provide adequate redress because immi-
grants are not afforded the normal protections of the Fourth Amendment 
while attempting to suppress the evidence.94 Immigrants are not entitled to a 
separate hearing on the suppression issue, and any statement they make to 
support the motion to suppress can be used against them to prove deporta-
bility.95 Additionally, even in cases where immigrants do not implicate their 
own deportability through testimony, it is almost impossible to suppress 
illegally acquired evidence and terminate removal proceedings.96 The rules 
of evidence in removal proceedings only allow for victims of the most 
egregious Fourth Amendment violations, a very small percentage of affect-
                                                                                                                           
 92 See, e.g., Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040 (explaining that an illegal arrest is generally 
irrelevant during removal proceedings); Wong Chung Che, 565 F.2d at 168 (holding that an illegal 
arrest does not invalidate subsequent removal proceedings); In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 79 
(noting that the government can sustain a deportation based on any records lawfully in its posses-
sion, regardless of an illegal stop and arrest). 
 93 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043 (noting that even if an unconstitutional arrest initiat-
ed deportation proceedings, deportation will still occur as long as there is evidence independent 
from the arrest to support a deportation order); In re Cervantes-Torres, 21 I. & N. Dec. 351, 353 
(B.I.A. 1996) (holding that an alien’s illegal arrest is irrelevant as long as the government has 
independently obtained evidence of alienage). But see De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 375–78 (noting 
that motions to suppress do provide immigrants a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations). 
 94 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51 (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary 
rule does not offer immigrants a remedy during removal proceedings); Katris v. INS, 562 F.2d 866, 
869 (2d Cir. 1977) (explaining that an immigrant is not protected from self-incrimination while 
testifying in support of a motion to suppress); supra note 77 (explaining that during criminal pro-
ceedings, unlike immigration removal proceedings, the Fourth Amendment requires that a defend-
ant’s statement in support of a motion to suppress cannot be used against the defendant to satisfy 
the government’s ultimate burden of proof). 
 95 See Katris, 562 F.2d at 869 (explaining that, even in the case of an unlawful arrest of an 
immigrant, deportation of that immigrant can be sustained based on the immigrant’s admission of 
his or her unlawful status at the removal hearing); In re Carrillo, 17 I. & N. Dec. 30, 32–33 (B.I.A. 
1979) (holding that an immigrant’s voluntary statement made at his removal hearing rendered his 
illegally obtained, inadmissible testimony irrelevant and unnecessary). 
 96 See, e.g., Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51 (holding that immigrants in removal pro-
ceedings are not able to utilize the exclusionary rule while attempting to suppress evidence); Puc-
Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 778–79 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that, during removal proceedings, 
only evidence obtained through an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment can be sup-
pressed); In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 188 (B.I.A. 1984) (noting that strict rules of evidence 
are not applicable in deportation proceedings). 
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ed individuals, to suppress evidence and to have an opportunity to receive 
any form of redress for the violation.97 
Finally, internal DHS procedures regulating the conduct of immigra-
tion officers fail to offer immigrants any further protection of their Fourth 
Amendment rights or provide them with any avenue for redress.98 Volumi-
nous research exposes the fact that federal immigration officials regularly 
and systematically disregard internal procedures designed to protect immi-
grants’ constitutional rights.99 Scholars have found that these federal offi-
cials routinely violate immigrants’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights de-
spite internal regulations and also systematically violate internal regulations 
when conducting worksite immigration raids.100 Instead of providing consti-
tutional protections, internal DHS policies actually encourage constitutional 
violations by incentivizing maximum arrest numbers and failing to offer 
sufficient training regarding reasonable suspicion requirements.101 In fact, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that federal immigra-
tion policy has created a “systemic” practice of Fourth Amendment viola-
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51 (holding that the exclusionary rule is severely 
diminished in effectiveness during immigration removal proceedings); Puc-Ruiz, 629 F.3d at 778–
79 (holding that only egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment result in suppressed evidence 
during removal proceedings). 
 98 See Treadwell, supra note 7, at 507 (explaining that, despite internal regulations, ICE has 
made warrantless home raids in violation of the Fourth Amendment a “key component” of immi-
gration enforcement activities). 
 99 See, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Viola-
tions in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 
2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1146 (“[T]he Justice Department’s internal regulations have failed to 
prevent behavior by immigration officers that violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”); 
Treadwell, supra note 7, at 559–61 (explaining that ICE has made home raids a “key component” 
of immigration enforcement activities); Watkins, supra note 89, at 565–69 (noting that immigrants 
in removal proceedings are very rarely successful in challenging immigration officials’ conduct 
that violated the regulations governing immigration enforcement); Michael J. Wishnie, Introduc-
tion—The Border Crossed Us: Current Issues in Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE. 389, 392–93 (2004) [hereinafter Wishnie, The Border Crossed Us] (displaying evidence 
that immigration officials “regularly raid worksites engaged in a labor controversy” in violation of 
agency regulations); Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 517 (2004) (concluding that immigration officials routinely ignore statutory 
provisions in the field of immigrant labor law). 
 100 See Elias, supra note 99, at 1146 (explaining that internal regulations have not prevented 
federal immigration officials from violating immigrants’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights); 
Treadwell, supra note 7, at 560 (finding that internal DHS procedures have incentivized systemat-
ic Fourth Amendment violations rather than preventing them); Wishnie, The Border Crossed Us, 
supra note 99, at 392–93 (displaying evidence that immigration officials regularly conduct work-
place raids in violation of federal regulations). 
 101 See Treadwell, supra note 7, at 560 (stating that internal DHS training procedures “no 
longer adequately address Fourth Amendment concerns” and instead act to incentivize Fourth 
Amendment violations). 
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tions by immigration agents.102 These ineffective procedures do not provide 
the type of internal administrative remedy necessary to foreclose the exten-
sion of a Bivens remedy.103 
By not supplementing these current procedures under the INA with the 
possibility of a Bivens remedy for immigrant victims of Fourth Amendment 
violations, the Fifth Circuit has authorized unconstitutional conduct by fed-
eral immigration officers.104 Under this current state of the law, immigrants 
in the United States will not be able to guarantee any meaningful protection 
of their constitutional right to be free from illegal search, seizure, or arrest 
under the Fourth Amendment.105 
CONCLUSION 
As the INA stands now, immigrants have very little chance of defending 
their Fourth Amendment rights during removal proceedings. Motions to sup-
                                                                                                                           
 102 Int’l Molders’ & Allied Workers’ Local Union v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir. 
1986) (agreeing with district court’s finding of “an evident systematic policy and practice of 
[F]ourth [A]mendment violations by INS” (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 n.6 
(1984))). 
 103 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386–88 (1983) (detailing the reasons why the Court 
decided against allowing the extension of the Bivens remedy when there was an adequate adminis-
trative remedial process in place). In 1983, in Bush v. Lucas, the administrative review process in 
place allowed the unconstitutionally demoted federal employee to recover back pay and to receive 
other employment benefits, avenues for redress not available to immigrants in removal proceed-
ings. Id. 
 104 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044 (explaining that every federal immigration officer 
understands that an immigrant will almost never attempt to suppress evidence based on the illegal-
ity of his initial arrest during a deportation proceeding and, thus, the prospect of these challenges 
provides practically no deterrent effect on the unconstitutional conduct of immigration officers); 
De La Paz II, 786 F.3d at 375 (holding that the INA’s statutory scheme adequately protects immi-
grants’ Fourth Amendment rights and thus makes extending Bivens to the immigration enforce-
ment context unnecessary); Lopez-Gabriel v. Holder, 653 F.3d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing 
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 457–58 (1976)) (stating that the prospect of evidence being 
suppressed during immigration deportation proceedings does not have a deterrent effect on law 
enforcement officials); Elias, supra note 99, at 1139–41 (arguing that current Fourth Amendment 
protections granted to immigrants during removal proceedings have done nothing to prevent wide-
spread Fourth Amendment violations by federal immigration agents); Steve Helfand, Desensitiza-
tion to Border Violence & the Bivens Remedy to Effectuate Systemic Change, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 87, 
122 (2001) (concluding that without the availability of a Bivens remedy, immigrants unconstitu-
tionally stopped in the border region will not be guaranteed any adequate constitutional remedy 
and future abuses will not be curtailed). 
 105 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044 (explaining that the possibility of an immigrant 
challenging an initial illegal arrest during a deportation hearing does not deter federal immigration 
agents from acting unconstitutionally); Lopez-Gabriel, 653 F.3d at 686 (stating that the current 
posture of immigration removal proceedings does not deter law enforcement officials from violat-
ing immigrants’ Fourth Amendment rights); Helfand, supra note 104, at 122 (concluding that the 
availability of a Bivens remedy to immigrants unconstitutionally stopped in the border region 
would help to guarantee such immigrants an adequate constitutional remedy and to curtail future 
abuses). 
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press do not offer immigrants a legitimate chance to terminate their proceed-
ings, and no evidence suggests that immigration officers follow regulations 
mandating compliance with the Fourth Amendment. Due to these realities, 
immigrants are neither provided an adequate remedy for constitutional viola-
tions, nor offered any hope that immigration officers will be deterred from 
violating their rights in the future. The Fifth Circuit’s failure to extend Bivens 
to the immigration enforcement context in De La Paz has thus undermined 
the entire purpose of the Bivens remedy, denied constitutional protection to 
immigrants in the United States, and endorsed the unconstitutional behavior 
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